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Abstract
We cannot help but impute emotions to the behaviors of others, and constantly infer not only what 
others are feeling, but also why they feel that way. The comprehension of other people’s emotional 
states is computationally complex and difficult, requiring the flexible, context-sensitive 
deployment of cognitive operations that encompass rapid orienting to, and recognition of, 
emotionally salient cues; classification of emotions into culturally-learned categories; and using an 
abstract theory of mind to reason about what caused the emotion, what future actions the person 
might be planning, and what we should do next in response. This review summarizes what 
neuroscience data - primarily functional neuroimaging data - has so far taught us about the 
cognitive architecture enabling emotion understanding in its various forms.
What is Emotion Understanding?
The essence of emotion understanding is the organization of information around discrete 
emotion categories. We regularly infer emotions from seeing somebody’s facial expression, 
from hearing an animal’s cries, from observing the way a person behaves in a crowd, or even 
just from reading a situation that a character is facing in a novel. These are all very different 
types of information, yet all can be made sense of by being classified into an emotion 
category. We refer to information of this kind as emotion-relevant. Typically, we have 
multiple such types of information available at the same time. To assign a category, such 
information must somehow be aggregated, with conflicts resolved, to arrive at an emotion 
category that is most consistent with the sensory evidence available.
We distinguish in our review processes for detecting and orienting attention to emotion-
relevant sensory cues in the environment (detection); processes for classifying information 
in emotional terms (categorization); and processes for attributing the categorized emotion to 
a cause (causal attribution), often through combination with other forms of social cognition, 
such as the representation of place-specific social norms and reasoning about mental-states 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004). As 
displayed in Figure 1, these three kinds of process can be conceived as yielding emotion 
understanding at different levels of abstraction, from a relatively shallow representation of 
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concrete nonverbal cues (e.g., “eyebrows raised toward midline”), to a relatively higher-level 
representation that combines these cues to infer the emotion category describing what the 
target is feeling (e.g., “fear”); and finally, to an even deeper appreciation of why the target 
feels that way (e.g., “delivering a speech in an hour”) (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). The 
rather heterogeneous literature germane to emotion understanding, and the correspondingly 
heterogeneous and unreliable neuroanatomy it has identified, can profit by acknowledging 
this representational diversity in how humans come to understand stimuli with emotional 
content. This scheme also makes specific predictions about how this might differ in animals, 
who may share with us the ability for low-level representations, but lack some of the high-
level inferences.
The serialized scheme in Figure 1 is of course in reality considerably more complicated in at 
least two ways. For one, all three of the stages depicted in fact typically occur in parallel and 
overlap in time. Indeed, emotion categorization and attribution can occur extremely rapidly: 
electrophysiological responses in prefrontal cortex (Kawasaki et al., 2001), and in the 
amygdala (Oya, Kawasaki, Howard, & Adolphs, 2002), that differentiate emotion categories 
inferred from visual stimuli have been reported with latencies around 100ms, as fast or faster 
than latencies required for object recognition. Relatedly, there is evidence for multisensory 
integration at even some of the earliest processing stages—for instance, subcortical 
structures like the superior colliculus and thalamus already show neuronal responses that 
integrate visual and auditory information (Ghose, Maier, Nidiffer, & Wallace, 2014; Miller, 
Pluta, Stein, & Rowland, 2015), and integration of emotional information can again be seen 
as early as 100ms with ERPs (Pourtois, de Gelder, Vroomen, Rossion, & Crommelinck, 
2000). This raises the second complication: all arrows in Figure 1 should be bidirectional, 
and there is good evidence that even high-level attributional representations (e.g., in 
prefrontal cortex) can feed back down to regions involved in detection and early perception 
(e.g., in visual cortices). This feedback is in line with computational architectures that 
emphasize predictive coding and Bayesian inference in perceptual cognition. This is a large 
subfield of computational neuroscience, in which several different models are being 
explored for their explanatory power in describing how the brain minimizes sensory errors 
given prior expectations – and one strategy may be to generate rough prior expectations very 
rapidly, and then refine them once sensory processing is complete.
Although we focus on emotion understanding from observing other people, such as seeing 
their facial expressions, as we noted above we regularly infer emotions also from mere 
descriptions of the situations in which people might find themselves. Several of the studies 
we mention below (e.g., Skerry & Saxe, 2015) in fact use such stimuli—lexical descriptions 
of scenarios from which we would infer an emotion. For example, imagine being told that a 
child badly wanted a puppy, and one day after school there is a new puppy at home that the 
child meets for the first time. There is no mention of any observable behavior on the part of 
child at all, yet this situation is as prototypical as a facial expression and we have no 
difficulty inferring “happiness” as the emotion. In this example, we do not engage all of the 
levels of processing shown in Figure 1: we are able to achieve emotion understanding even 
in the absence of detection of observable sensory cues. Nonetheless, information about the 
emotion that can be inferred from this description is represented in the same network of 
brain structures as for inferring emotions from visual stimuli that show people’s behavior 
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(Skerry & Saxe, 2014). Given the diversity of naturalistic settings in which humans interact 
and communicate their emotional states to one another, the actual cognitive processes 
involved in any given instance of emotion understanding will thus vary as a function of the 
stimulus.
Is there emotion? Detecting emotion-relevant cues
People and animals have evolved mechanisms for rapidly detecting the presence of 
emotional information in the environment. While many of these cues signal information 
most relevant for the observer (such as potential threats), there is also evidence for detecting 
a broader array of sensory cues that can serve as building blocks for constructing an emotion 
understanding of other people. For example, a recent study used multivoxel pattern analysis 
(MVPA), a multivariate classification approach that distinguishes stimulus categories by 
patterns of activation measured across many voxels, and found that the right posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) contained reliable information about the presence of 
different facial actions (such as raising the inner corners of the eyebrows) that provide the 
basic action units that, when combined, form distinct emotional expressions (Srinivasan, 
Golomb, & Martinez, 2016).
Similarly, there is a line of work encompassing lesions (Adolphs et al., 2005), single-unit 
recordings (Rutishauser et al., 2013), and fMRI (Gamer & Büchel, 2009) suggesting that the 
amygdala may be particularly sensitive to wide eyes in faces that may signal fear. The eye 
region of the face tends to draw the observer’s visual attention; this attentional bias 
correlates with amygdala activity in healthy adults and is reduced in patients with amygdala 
lesions, who also show a corresponding deficit in recognizing fear in facial expressions 
(Adolphs et al., 2005). There are analogs in other sensory modalities; for instance, screams 
and cries possess a specific acoustic ingredient—power modulations in the 30–150Hz range
—that imbues them with the emotional quality of “roughness” and also activates the 
amygdala (Arnal, Flinker, Kleinschmidt, Giraud, & Poeppel, 2015). There is ongoing debate 
about the extent to which such cue detection, and in particular the amygdala’s role in it, is 
automatic and non-conscious (e.g., Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).
What are they feeling? Identifying specific emotions
Specific cues can serve to direct our attention to information that is salient for emotion 
understanding, yet by themselves they typically underconstrain the interpretations that are 
possible. Somebody might also be screaming or wide-eyed after having won a big prize, 
rather than in anticipation of being eaten by a tiger. Whereas emotion-relevant cues may thus 
map onto coarser dimensions such as valence or arousal, classifying emotions into specific 
categories of individual emotions requires more inference and generally involves cortical 
sensory regions in addition to subcortical structures. The cortical regions involved are 
generally those that represent that sensory modality and its specialized processing aspects. 
For instance, categorizing emotion from facial expressions involves cortical regions in the 
temporal lobe known to represent faces or biological motion; categorizing emotion from 
voices involves primary and higher-order auditory cortices. MVPA has shown that there is 
information about emotion categories in the activation pattern seen in face-selective areas of 
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fusiform gyrus (Skerry & Saxe, 2015), the medial prefrontal cortex (Peelen, Atkinson, & 
Vuilleumier, 2010) (to which we return below), and the superior temporal sulcus (Wegrzyn 
et al., 2015) (involved in face and biological motion processing). Yet it is important to note 
that strong evidence for fine-grained representation of different emotions is still lacking, in 
good part because most studies only contrast one or two emotions, but not a large number of 
emotions.
Related to difficulties in investigating representations for specific emotions are two further 
important points. First, one might think that the sparse sampling of different emotions in any 
single neuroimaging study could be overcome simply by meta-analyses that look across a 
large number of studies. This has in fact been done in a number of meta-analyses, which 
conclude either that there is no specificity in how the brain represents individual emotions at 
all (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), that such representation is 
overlapping and distributed (Wager et al., 2015), or that it is lower-dimensional than for 
specific emotions (e.g., just for valence, as supported also by some individual research 
studies; Chikazoe, Lee, Kriegeskorte, & Anderson, 2014). One problem with all these is that 
the studies going into the meta-analyses are of mixed quality and highly variable in stimuli 
and tasks, making it difficult to extract specific conclusions. Another problem is that the 
resolution of fMRI, especially univariate fMRI, may well be too low to resolve 
representations of distinct emotions. Indeed, as we saw above, the best emerging evidence 
for specific emotion representations comes from MVPA, not from univariate analyses.
But a second important problem for investigating the neural basis of recognizing specific 
emotions is to decide what those emotions should be in the first place. There is a commonly 
used set of about six “basic” emotions (happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust and sadness), 
which are the set that psychologists like Paul Ekman have claimed are recognized 
universally across cultures (Ekman, 1994). But there is also good emerging evidence that in 
fact emotions are not categorized similarly across all cultures at all (from either face or 
voice; Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver, & Barrett, 2014a; Gendron, Roberson, van der 
Vyver, & Barrett, 2014b) making it unclear what should be the “ground truth” for how to 
divide up the categories. Even if there were consensus on the categories to include, issues 
remain with the common practice of using prototypic, exaggerated facial expressions to 
represent them. This is because people rarely encounter the prototypic form of some 
emotions, such as fear (Somerville & Whalen, 2006). In addition to introducing problematic 
confounds in prior experience between emotion categories, such a lack of realism in the 
stimuli used in these studies imposes strong limits on the ecological validity of the 
psychological processes being elicited (Zaki & Ochsner, 2009).
Following a historical proposal by William James (James, 1884), several modern theories of 
the conscious experience of emotion (feelings) hypothesize that we feel emotions in virtue 
of our brain representing the body states associated with the emotion (Damasio, 2003; Craig, 
2008). In light of studies showing that observers often mimic (i.e., mirror) the emotional 
behavior of others, James’ mechanism suggests that observers may understand what others 
are feeling because they can vicariously experience the same feeling in themselves i.e., that 
we simulate the body state of another person by representing that state in somatosensory-
related regions (S1, S2, insula) in our own brain (Goldman & Sripada, 2005). In support of 
Spunt and Adolphs Page 4





















this hypothesis, lesions of somatosensory-related cortices (particularly in the right 
hemisphere) disrupt people’s ability to recognize facial emotion (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, 
Cooper, & Damasio, 2000). Most interestingly, fMRI studies have found that MVPA of 
regions within right somatosensory cortex represented information about specific facial 
expressions, and that this representation showed some somatotopy such that specific 
emotions could be decoded from those regions of S1 that represent the facial features most 
diagnostic for that emotion (such as wide eyes for fear; Kragel & LaBar, 2015).
Why are they feeling it? Causal attribution of emotion
Imagine witnessing your close colleague pound their fists while seated at their desk, mouth 
agape as they glare at their computer monitor. To fully understand this emotional situation, it 
would be insufficient to merely recognize that your colleague is angry. Instead, observers 
need to generate a coherent account, an explanation, of what it is that they observe: they 
need also to understand why the other person feels the way they do, and this is accomplished 
by making causal attributions. This final, richest, aspect of emotion understanding thus 
involves two components that each map onto somewhat distinct neural regions: (1) an 
understanding of the emotion in terms of semantic knowledge about the emotion (often 
encoded in language); (2) an understanding of the emotion in terms of its causes. The first 
involves brain regions that store semantic conceptual knowledge; and the second brain 
regions broadly involved in Theory of Mind (Figure 2).
For component (1), regions within the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) are believed to be 
critically involved in maintaining conceptual knowledge about the social world. Such 
knowledge includes both specific facts about familiar others (e.g., their first name, favorite 
foods) (Sugiura et al., 2006; Imaizumi et al., 1997), as well as more general abstract beliefs 
about the world, such as place-specific behavioral norms and mental-state and trait concepts 
(Zahn et al., 2007; Lambon Ralph, Pobric, & Jefferies, 2009).
For component (2), the attribution of identified emotions to abstract causes is likely 
supported by regions in the dorsomedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices. These regions 
are thought to implement executive functions for retrieving relevant abstract knowledge and 
selecting among competing interpretations of complex stimuli (Satpute, Badre, & Ochsner, 
2013; Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; Goldberg, Perfetti, Fiez, & Schneider, 2007; Green, 
Fugelsang, Kraemer, Shamosh, & Dunbar, 2006), functions that, in the domain of emotional 
and social inference, typically take the form of mental-state inferences (Spunt, Ellsworth, & 
Adolphs, 2016; Spunt, Kemmerer, & Adolphs, 2016; Skerry & Saxe, 2015; Kim et al., 2015; 
Skerry & Saxe, 2014). Indeed, meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies of theory-of-mind 
reasoning in its various forms reliably implicate these same regions (Van Overwalle & 
Baetens, 2009; Amodio & Frith, 2006; Gallagher & Frith, 2003), and the specific association 
with tasks used to assess theory-of-mind is particularly reliable for the dmPFC (Schurz, 
Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014).
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By way of conclusion, we briefly identify several questions and issues that would be 
important to tackle in future neuroscience research on emotion understanding. Two general 
issues that face current studies are about details: to provide a more detailed account of the 
different processes schematized in Figure 1 and to understand how they interact; and to 
provide a more detailed, and possibly different, set of emotion categories. Addressing both 
of these issues will require careful attention to task design, and will likely require obtaining 
behavioral performance measures as well as experimental designs informed by 
computational models. It will also require a close consideration of individual differences 
(e.g., goals, beliefs, prior experience) that might lead different observers to different 
interpretations of an emotional stimulus (e.g., Spunt & Adolphs, 2015; Spunt, Ellsworth, & 
Adolphs, 2016).
Another rich domain will be to understand the automatic or controlled nature of emotion 
understanding (for further discussion, see Spunt and Lieberman, 2014). While we believe 
that both processing aspects are involved, the assumption has generally been that emotion 
inference is relatively automatic. Can we control how we see emotions in other people? If 
so, can we train people to see others differently? These important open questions are also 
relevant for disorders such as autism, in which emotion inference is atypical.
A final topic for the future would be to bring the investigation of self-attribution of emotions 
closer to the literature we have reviewed here. Do we engage some of the same neural 
systems when we attribute an emotion to ourselves as we do when we attribute emotions to 
others? While self-relevant processing has also prominently highlighted one of the nodes we 
noted above—the dorsomedial PFC—it remains quite opaque what to put into the bottom 
two levels of processing in Figure 1, since we do not know what normally starts an emotion 
understanding process when it is applied to oneself.
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• emotion understanding consists of detecting cues, inferring emotion 
categories, and attributing causes
• a network of brain structures is involved for each of these
• the dmPFC is the most prominent brain regions involved in inferring emotions 
and causes
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An illustration of the hierarchical and multifaceted nature of understanding other people’s 
behavior in emotional terms. We use fear as an example, but note that the distinctions we 
make can be applied to any emotion category. To simplify, we demonstrated how a fearful 
facial expression might be identified at three levels of abstraction. At the lowest level are the 
different elements of the stimulus (e.g., facial and bodily actions, object of gaze) that in 
combination can be understood in terms of relatively higher-level behavioral categories, such 
as fear. Using our capacity for reasoning about the causes of behavior (e.g., using a Theory 
of Mind), even higher levels of understanding become possible: We understand not just that 
the person is expressing fear, but why they are expressing it. To organize the literature 
review shown in the main text, we compartmentalize component processes as contributing 
primarily to either early detection of emotion-relevant cues; intermediate categorization of 
the behavior in terms of emotion and action categories; and, finally, further inferences that 
serve to build a coherent narrative that identifies the cause(s) of the emotion. In actuality, 
processing at these three levels is typically concurrent and involves substantial feedback, not 
shown in this figure.
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Selected brain structures implicated in the different functional components of emotion 
understanding discussed in the main text. Each structure is color-coded to indicate, based on 
existing evidence, the component(s) to which it contributes. To enable a clear visualization, a 
number of structures known to be involved in emotion understanding are discussed in the 
main text but not shown in this figure. aTC, anterior temporal cortex; pSTS, posterior 
superior temporal sulcus; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; vlPFC, ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex. Portions of this figure adapted from Adolphs (2010).
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